Augustine and the cognitive cause of Stoic preliminary passions (propatheiai)

Augustine made a significant contribution to the history of philosophical accounts of affectivity which scholars have not yet noticed. He resolved a problem with the Stoic theory as it was known to him: the question of the cognitive cause of "preliminary passions" ( propatheiai ), reflex-like affect...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Author:Sarah C. Byers
Published: S.n., s.l., 2003
Volume:41
Pages:433-448
Language:English
Periodical:Journal of the History of Philosophy
Number:4
Format:Article
Topic:- Doctrine > Man > [Vie affective. Passions] > Affectivity / desire(s) / émotions / instincts / passions / sentiments / pleasure > Affectivity / passions > [Passions (et stoïcisme)]
Status:Needs Review
Description
Summary:Augustine made a significant contribution to the history of philosophical accounts of affectivity which scholars have not yet noticed. He resolved a problem with the Stoic theory as it was known to him: the question of the cognitive cause of "preliminary passions" ( propatheiai ), reflex-like affective reactions which must be immediately controlled if a morally bad emotion is to be avoided. He identified this cognitive cause as momentary doubt , as I demonstrate by citing passages from sermons spanning twenty-seven years in which Augustine consistently used a particular set of scriptural images and phrases as precise analogies for mental and affective states.

Similar Items